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- Internet Draft
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- The Definitions of Managed Objects for
- the Security Protocols of
- the Point-to-Point Protocol
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- 19 April 1993
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- Frank Kastenholz
- FTP Software, Inc
- 2 High Street
- North Andover, Mass 01845 USA
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- kasten@ftp.com
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- Status of this Memo
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- This document is an Internet Draft. Internet Drafts are
- working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force
- (IETF), its Areas, and its Working Groups. Note that other
- groups may also distribute working documents as Internet
- Drafts.
-
- Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
- months. Internet Drafts may be updated, replaced, or
- obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is not
- appropriate to use Internet Drafts as reference material or to
- cite them other than as a ``working draft'' or ``work in
- progress.'' Please check the 1id-abstracts.txt listing
- contained in the internet-drafts Shadow Directories on
- nic.ddn.mil, nnsc.nsf.net, nic.nordu.net, ftp.nisc.sri.com, or
- munnari.oz.au to learn the current status of any Internet
- Draft.
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- Internet Draft PPP/Security MIB April 1993
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- This document will be submitted to the Internet Activities
- Board as a Proposed Standard. This document defines an
- experimental extension to the SNMP MIB. Upon publication as a
- Proposed Standard, a new MIB number will be assigned. This is
- a working document only, it should neither be cited nor quoted
- in any formal document.
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- This document will expire before 24 Oct. 1993.
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- Distribution of this document is unlimited.
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- Please send comments to the author.
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- 1. Abstract
-
- This memo defines an experimental portion of the Management
- Information Base (MIB) for use with network management
- protocols in TCP/IP-based internets. In particular, it
- describes managed objects used for managing the Security
- Protocols on subnetwork interfaces using the family of
- Point-to-Point Protocols[8, 9, 10, 11, & 12].
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- This memo does not specify a standard for the Internet
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- 2. The Network Management Framework
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- The Internet-standard Network Management Framework consists of
- three components. They are:
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- RFC 1155 which defines the SMI, the mechanisms used for
- describing and naming objects for the purpose of
- management. RFC 1212 defines a more concise description
- mechanism, which is wholly consistent with the SMI.
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- RFC 1213 defines MIB-II, the core set of managed objects
- for the Internet suite of protocols.
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- RFC 1157 which defines the SNMP, the protocol used for
- network access to managed objects.
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- The Framework permits new objects to be defined for the
- purpose of experimentation and evaluation.
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- 3. Objects
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- Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store,
- termed the Management Information Base or MIB. Objects in the
- MIB are defined using the subset of Abstract Syntax Notation
- One (ASN.1) [3] defined in the SMI. In particular, each
- object type is named by an OBJECT IDENTIFIER, an
- administratively assigned name. The object type together with
- an object instance serves to uniquely identify a specific
- instantiation of the object. For human convenience, we often
- use a textual string, termed the descriptor, to refer to the
- object type.
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- 3.1. Format of Definitions
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- Section 5 contains the specification of all object types
- contained in this MIB module. The object types are defined
- using the conventions defined in the SMI, as amended by the
- extensions specified in [5,6].
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- 4. Overview
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- 4.1. Object Selection Criteria
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- To be consistent with IAB directives and good engineering
- practice, an explicit attempt was made to keep this MIB as
- simple as possible. This was accomplished by applying the
- following criteria to objects proposed for inclusion:
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- (1) Require objects be essential for either fault or
- configuration management. In particular, objects for
- which the sole purpose was to debug implementations were
- explicitly excluded from the MIB.
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- (2) Consider evidence of current use and/or utility.
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- (3) Limit the total number of objects.
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- (4) Exclude objects which are simply derivable from others in
- this or other MIBs.
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- 4.2. Structure of the PPP
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- This section describes the basic model of PPP used in
- developing the PPP MIB. This information should be useful to
- the implementor in understanding some of the basic design
- decisions of the MIB.
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- The PPP is not one single protocol but a large family of
- protocols. Each of these is, in itself, a fairly complex
- protocol. The PPP protocols may be divided into three rough
- categories:
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- Control Protocols
- The Control Protocols are used to control the operation
- of the PPP. The Control Protocols include the Link
- Control Protocol (LCP), the Password Authentication
- Protocol (PAP), the Link Quality Report (LQR), and the
- Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP).
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- Network Protocols
- The Network Protocols are used to move the network
- traffic over the PPP interface. A Network Protocol
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- encapsulates the datagrams of a specific higher-layer
- protocol that is using the PPP as a data link. Note that
- within the context of PPP, the term "Network Protocol"
- does not imply an OSI Layer-3 protocol; for instance,
- there is a Bridging network protocol.
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- Network Control Protocols (NCPs)
- The NCPs are used to control the operation of the Network
- Protocols. Generally, each Network Protocol has its own
- Network Control Protocol; thus, the IP Network Protocol
- has its IP Control Protocol, the Bridging Network
- Protocol has its Bridging Network Control Protocol and so
- on.
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- This document specifies the objects used in managing one of
- these protocols, namely the PPP Authentication Protocols.
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- 4.3. MIB Groups
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- Objects in this MIB are arranged into several MIB groups.
- Each group is organized as a set of related objects.
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- These groups are the basic unit of conformance: if the
- semantics of a group are applicable to an implementation then
- all objects in the group must be implemented.
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- The PPP MIB is organized into several MIB Groups, including,
- but not limited to, the following groups:
- o The PPP Link Group
- o The PPP LQR Group
- o The PPP LQR Extensions Group
- o The PPP IP Group
- o The PPP Bridge Group
- o The PPP Security Group
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- This document specifies the following group:
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- PPP Security Group
- The PPP Security Group contains all configuration and
- control variables that apply to PPP security.
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- Implementation of this group is optional. Implementation
- is optional since the variables in this group provide
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- configuration and control for the PPP Security functions.
- Thus, these variables should be protected by SNMPv2
- security. If an agent does not support SNMPv2 with
- privacy it is strongly advised that this group not be
- implemented. See the section on "Security
- Considerations" at the end of this document.
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- 5. Definitions
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- PPP-SEC-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
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- IMPORTS
- experimental, Counter
- FROM RFC1155-SMI
- OBJECT-TYPE
- FROM RFC-1212
- ppp
- FROM PPP-LCP-MIB;
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- pppSecurity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ppp 2 }
-
- pppSecurityProtocols OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pppSecurity 1 }
-
- -- The following uniquely identify the various protocols
- -- used by PPP security. These OBJECT IDENTIFIERS are
- -- used in the pppSecurityConfigProtocol and
- -- pppSecuritySecretsProtocol objects to identify to which
- -- protocols the table entries apply.
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- pppSecurityPapProtocol OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
- { pppSecurityProtocols 1 }
- pppSecurityChapMD5Protocol OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
- { pppSecurityProtocols 2 }
-
- -- PPP Security Group
- -- Implementation of this group is optional.
-
- -- This table allows the network manager to configure
- -- which security protocols are to be used on which
- -- link and in what order of preference each is to be tried
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- pppSecurityConfigTable OBJECT-TYPE
- SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF PppSecurityConfigEntry
- ACCESS not-accessible
- STATUS mandatory
- DESCRIPTION
- "Table containing the configuration and
- preference parameters for PPP Security."
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- ::= { pppSecurity 2 }
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- pppSecurityConfigEntry OBJECT-TYPE
- SYNTAX PppSecurityConfigEntry
- ACCESS not-accessible
- STATUS mandatory
- DESCRIPTION
- "Security configuration information for a
- particular PPP link."
- INDEX { pppSecurityConfigLink,
- pppSecurityConfigPreference }
- ::= { pppSecurityConfigTable 1 }
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- PppSecurityConfigEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
- pppSecurityConfigLink
- INTEGER,
- pppSecurityConfigPreference
- INTEGER,
- pppSecurityConfigProtocol
- OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- pppSecurityStatus
- INTEGER
- }
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- pppSecurityConfigLink OBJECT-TYPE
- SYNTAX INTEGER(0..2147483648)
- ACCESS read-write
- STATUS mandatory
- DESCRIPTION
- "The value of ifIndex that identifies the entry
- in the interface table that is associated with
- the local PPP entity's link for which this
- particular security algorithm shall be
- attempted. A value of 0 indicates the default
- algorithm - i.e., this entry applies to all
- links for which explicit entries in the table
- do not exist."
- ::= { pppSecurityConfigEntry 1 }
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- pppSecurityConfigPreference OBJECT-TYPE
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- SYNTAX INTEGER(0..2147483648)
- ACCESS read-write
- STATUS mandatory
- DESCRIPTION
- "The relative preference of the security
- protocol identified by
- pppSecurityConfigProtocol. Security protocols
- with lower values of
- pppSecurityConfigPreference are tried before
- protocols with higher values of
- pppSecurityConfigPreference."
- ::= { pppSecurityConfigEntry 2 }
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- pppSecurityConfigProtocol OBJECT-TYPE
- SYNTAX OBJECT IDENTIFIER
- ACCESS read-write
- STATUS mandatory
- DESCRIPTION
- "Identifies the security protocol to be
- attempted on the link identified by
- pppSecurityConfigLink at the preference level
- identified by pppSecurityConfigPreference. "
- ::= { pppSecurityConfigEntry 3 }
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- pppSecurityConfigStatus OBJECT-TYPE
- SYNTAX INTEGER {
- invalid(1),
- valid(2)
- }
- ACCESS read-write
- STATUS mandatory
- DESCRIPTION
- "Setting this object to the value invalid(1)
- has the effect of invalidating the
- corresponding entry in the
- pppSecurityConfigTable. It is an
- implementation-specific matter as to whether
- the agent removes an invalidated entry from the
- table. Accordingly, management stations must
- be prepared to receive tabular information from
- agents that corresponds to entries not
- currently in use. Proper interpretation of
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- such entries requires examination of the
- relevant pppSecurityConfigStatus object."
- DEFVAL { valid }
- ::= { pppSecurityConfigEntry 4 }
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- -- This table contains all of the ID/Secret pair information.
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- pppSecuritySecretsTable OBJECT-TYPE
- SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF PppSecuritySecretsEntry
- ACCESS not-accessible
- STATUS mandatory
- DESCRIPTION
- "Table containing the identities and secrets
- used by the PPP authentication protocols. As
- this table contains secret information, it is
- expected that access to this table be limited
- to those SNMP Party-Pairs for which a privacy
- protocol is in use for all SNMP messages that
- the parties exchange. This table contains both
- the ID and secret pair(s) that the local PPP
- entity will advertise to the remote entity and
- the pair(s) that the local entity will expect
- from the remote entity. This table allows for
- multiple id/secret password pairs to be
- specified for a particular link by using the
- pppSecuritySecretsIdIndex object."
- ::= { pppSecurity 3 }
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- pppSecuritySecretsEntry OBJECT-TYPE
- SYNTAX PppSecuritySecretsEntry
- ACCESS not-accessible
- STATUS mandatory
- DESCRIPTION
- "Secret information."
- INDEX { pppSecuritySecretsLink,
- pppSecuritySecretsIdIndex }
- ::= { pppSecuritySecretsTable 1 }
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- PppSecuritySecretEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
- pppSecuritySecretsLink
- INTEGER,
- pppSecuritySecretsIdIndex
- INTEGER,
- pppSecuritySecretsDirection
- INTEGER,
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- pppSecuritySecretsProtocol
- OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- pppSecuritySecretsIdentity
- OCTET STRING,
- pppSecuritySecretsSecret
- OCTET STRING,
- pppSecuritySecretsStatus
- INTEGER
- }
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- pppSecuritySecretsLink OBJECT-TYPE
- SYNTAX INTEGER(0..2147483648)
- ACCESS read-only
- STATUS mandatory
- DESCRIPTION
- "The link to which this ID/Secret pair applies.
- By convention, if the value of this object is 0
- then the ID/Secret pair applies to all links."
- ::= { pppSecuritySecretsEntry 1 }
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- pppSecuritySecretsIdIndex OBJECT-TYPE
- SYNTAX INTEGER(0..2147483648)
- ACCESS read-only
- STATUS mandatory
- DESCRIPTION
- "A unique value for each ID/Secret pair that
- has been defined for use on this link. This
- allows multiple ID/Secret pairs to be defined
- for each link. How the local entity selects
- which pair to use is a local implementation
- decision."
- ::= { pppSecuritySecretsEntry 2 }
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- pppSecuritySecretsDirection OBJECT-TYPE
- SYNTAX INTEGER {
- local-to-remote(1),
- remote-to-local(2)
- }
- ACCESS read-write
- STATUS mandatory
- DESCRIPTION
- "This object defines the direction in which a
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- particular ID/Secret pair is valid. If this
- object is local-to-remote then the local PPP
- entity will use the ID/Secret pair when
- attempting to authenticate the local PPP entity
- to the remote PPP entity. If this object is
- remote-to-local then the local PPP entity will
- expect the ID/Secret pair to be used by the
- remote PPP entity when the remote PPP entity
- attempts to authenticate itself to the local
- PPP entity."
- ::= { pppSecuritySecretsEntry 3 }
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- pppSecuritySecretsProtocol OBJECT-TYPE
- SYNTAX OBJECT IDENTIFIER
- ACCESS read-write
- STATUS mandatory
- DESCRIPTION
- "The security protocol (e.g. CHAP or PAP) to
- which this ID/Secret pair applies."
- ::= { pppSecuritySecretsEntry 4 }
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- pppSecuritySecretsIdentity OBJECT-TYPE
- SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..255))
- ACCESS read-write
- STATUS mandatory
- DESCRIPTION
- "The Identity of the ID/Secret pair. The
- actual format, semantics, and use of
- pppSecuritySecretsIdentity depends on the
- actual security protocol used. For example, if
- pppSecuritySecretsProtocol is
- pppSecurityPapProtocol then this object will
- contain a PAP Peer-ID. If
- pppSecuritySecretsProtocol is
- pppSecurityChapMD5Protocol then this object
- would contain the CHAP NAME parameter."
- ::= { pppSecuritySecretsEntry 5 }
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- pppSecuritySecretsSecret OBJECT-TYPE
- SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..255))
- ACCESS read-write
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- STATUS mandatory
- DESCRIPTION
- "The secret of the ID/Secret pair. The actual
- format, semantics, and use of
- pppSecuritySecretsSecret depends on the actual
- security protocol used. For example, if
- pppSecuritySecretsProtocol is
- pppSecurityPapProtocol then this object will
- contain a PAP Password. If
- pppSecuritySecretsProtocol is
- pppSecurityChapMD5Protocol then this object
- would contain the CHAP MD5 Secret."
- ::= { pppSecuritySecretsEntry 6 }
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- pppSecuritySecretsStatus OBJECT-TYPE
- SYNTAX INTEGER {
- invalid(1),
- valid(2)
- }
- ACCESS read-write
- STATUS mandatory
- DESCRIPTION
- "Setting this object to the value invalid(1)
- has the effect of invalidating the
- corresponding entry in the
- pppSecuritySecretsTable. It is an
- implementation-specific matter as to whether
- the agent removes an invalidated entry from the
- table. Accordingly, management stations must
- be prepared to receive tabular information from
- agents that corresponds to entries not
- currently in use. Proper interpretation of
- such entries requires examination of the
- relevant pppSecuritySecretsStatus object."
- DEFVAL { valid }
- ::= { pppSecuritySecretsEntry 7 }
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- 6. Acknowledgements
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- This document was produced by the PPP working group. In
- addition to the working group, the author wishes to thank the
- following individuals for their comments and contributions:
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- Bill Simpson -- Daydreamer
- Glenn McGregor -- Merit
- Jesse Walker -- DEC
- Chris Gunner -- DEC
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- 7. Security Considerations
-
- The PPP MIB affords the network operator the ability to
- configure and control the PPP links of a particular system,
- including the PPP authentication protocols. This represents a
- security risk.
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- These risks are addressed in the following manners:
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- (1) All variables which represent a significant security risk
- are placed in separate, optional, MIB Groups. As the MIB
- Group is the quantum of implementation within a MIB, the
- implementor of the MIB may elect not to implement these
- groups.
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- (2) The implementor may choose to implement the variables
- which present a security risk so that they may not be
- written, i.e., the variables are READ-ONLY. This method
- still presents a security risk, and is not recommended,
- in that the variables, specifically the PPP
- Authentication Protocols' variables, may be easily read.
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- (3) Using SNMPv2, the operator can place the variables into
- MIB views which are protected in that the parties which
- have access to those MIB views use authentication and
- privacy protocols, or the operator may elect to make
- these views not accessible to any party. In order to
- facilitate this placement, all security-related variables
- are placed in separate MIB Tables. This eases the
- identification of the necessary MIB View Subtree.
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- (4) The PPP Security Protocols MIB (this document) contains
- several objects which are very sensitive from a security
- point of view.
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- Specifically, this MIB contains objects that define the
- PPP Peer Identities (which can be viewed as "userids")
- and the secrets used to authenticate those Peer
- Identities (similar to a "password" for the "userid").
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- Also, this MIB contains variables which would allow a
- network manager to control the operation of the security
- features of PPP. An intruder could disable PPP security
- if these variables were not properly protected.
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- Thus, in order to preserve the integrity, security and
- privacy of the PPP security features, an implementation
- will allow access to this MIB only via SNMPv2 and then
- only for parties which are privacy enhanced. Other
- access modes, e.g., SNMPv1 or SNMPv2 without privacy-
- enhancement, are very dangerous and the security of the
- PPP service may be compromised.
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- 8. References
-
- [1] M.T. Rose and K. McCloghrie, Structure and Identification
- of Management Information for TCP/IP-based internets,
- Internet Working Group Request for Comments 1155.
- Network Information Center, SRI International, Menlo
- Park, California, (May, 1990).
-
- [2] K. McCloghrie and M.T. Rose, Management Information Base
- for Network Management of TCP/IP-based internets - MIB-2,
- Internet Working Group Request for Comments 1213.
- Network Information Center, SRI International, Menlo
- Park, California, (March, 1991).
-
- [3] Information processing systems - Open Systems
- Interconnection - Specification of Abstract Syntax
- Notation One (ASN.1), International Organization for
- Standardization. International Standard 8824, (December,
- 1987).
-
- [4] Information processing systems - Open Systems
- Interconnection - Specification of Basic Encoding Rules
- for Abstract Notation One (ASN.1), International
- Organization for Standardization. International Standard
- 8825, (December, 1987).
-
- [5] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, Editors, Concise MIB
- Definitions, RFC 1212, Performance Systems International,
- Hughes LAN Systems, March 1991.
-
- [6] Rose, M., Editor, A Convention for Defining Traps for use
- with the SNMP, RFC 1215, Performance Systems
- International, March 1991.
-
- [7] K. McCloghrie, Extensions to the Generic-Interface MIB,
- RFC1229, Hughes LAN Systems, May 1991.
-
- [8] W. Simpson, The Point-to-Point Protocol for the
- Transmission of Multi-protocol Datagrams over Point-to-
- Point Links, RFC 1331, May 1992.
-
- [9] G. McGregor, The PPP Internet Protocol Control Protocol,
- RFC 1332, Merit, May 1992.
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- [10] F. Baker, Point-to-Point Protocol Extensions for
- Bridging, RFC1220, ACC, April 1991.
-
- [11] B. Lloyd, and Simpson, W., PPP Authentication Protocols
- RFC1334, October 1992.
-
- [12] W. Simpson, PPP Link Quality Monitoring, RFC 1333, May
- 1992.
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- Frank J. Kastenholz Exp. 24 Oct. 1993 [Page 20]
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- Internet Draft PPP/Security MIB April 1993
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- Table of Contents
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- Status of this Memo .................................... 1
- 1 Abstract .............................................. 2
- 2 The Network Management Framework ...................... 3
- 3 Objects ............................................... 4
- 3.1 Format of Definitions ............................... 4
- 4 Overview .............................................. 5
- 4.1 Object Selection Criteria ........................... 5
- 4.2 Structure of the PPP ................................ 5
- 4.3 MIB Groups .......................................... 6
- 5 Definitions ........................................... 8
- 6 Acknowledgements ...................................... 16
- 7 Security Considerations ............................... 17
- 8 References ............................................ 19
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- Frank J. Kastenholz Exp. 24 Oct. 1993 [Page 21]
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